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We have Lands, But Why Are We Poor's? Some evidence from African countries

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Abstract

The approach does show some inefficiencies in agricultural policy in many African countries, where in fact there is no optimum relationship between agricultural policies and the particular levels of development that countries should adopt in the first place. Thus, the approach suggests the existence of some inefficiencies related to the way in which agriculture in Africa is a continuous failure. On the other hand, investments contribute to success, for example the low levels of investment that exist promote such inefficiencies in line with institutional inefficiencies, which in turn promote the increase in food insecurity in these countries in particular. The failure of agrarian reform in many countries contributes to the inefficiency of agrarian policy, where its absence is significant. On the other hand, countries that have achieved a turnaround, such as South Africa, have nevertheless managed to change the course and direction of agriculture, in line with the initiatives of Rwanda and Ghana.

Key words: Agrarian policy, Development, Agricultural potential, JEL

Classification: Q01 Q10; Q15; Q18

Introduction

On the one hand, Africa's continuing poverty is the result of the productive inefficiencies of developing countries and, on the other, the need for governments to remain poor from the outset and shackled to unfounded economic policies that have not been sufficiently capable of responding to the distinct needs of the local population, in particular, why are we still poor? Thus, it seems plausible to agree that the approach of the existence of arable land is not plausible to understand why African countries continue to fail.

The distinctions between the West and Africa allow us to analyse from the outset how poor African countries are. We continue to fail not because we have been colonised by the West or because we have had successive civil wars, or because we don't have the best managers in the world to run our companies and our public institutions. We continue to fail because there seems to be a deep-rooted institutional ignorance on the part of political decision-makers, which triggers a profound ignorance of how poor we are and how poor our public institutions are and how inefficient the services they provide have been.

So, in order to better understand the approach to poverty in Africa, it is naturally important to analyse how people live, what people in developing countries eat? What do African people wear? How do African people look after themselves and who looks after them? What are the health systems like in Africa? How long do Africans live, what kind of quality of life do Africans have? Do people breathe good air? When it rains, is it possible to walk through the various streets of the city? Is there food safety in the main foods traded? Are the markets properly structured? Is the meat consumed by African families inspected beforehand? Is the drinking water sufficiently treated? Is there naturally a good waste management system? These and other questions, however, I will answer in the course of the study.

In order to understand these inefficiencies, the starting point is to find out how Africans eat, so we begin by analysing agriculture as a promoter of prosperity in developing countries.

Agriculture represents an alternative for leveraging domestic production, despite the great risk it presents, the agricultural sector is significantly relevant for guaranteeing domestic needs, there is a significant amount of fertile land and abundant water resources, but some approaches continue to suggest inefficiencies related above all to the lack, for example, of an equitable distribution of land. Thus, it is plausible that a large proportion of African countries remain significantly trapped in underdevelopment, due on the one hand to ongoing institutional ignorance, and on the other hand to the fact that there are some ongoing vicious circles, which suggest on the one hand, the lack of continuity of inclusive policies. A large number of African countries share not only mineral resource potential but also fertile land, which from the outset should contribute to increasing levels of domestic production in particular. However, the evidence seems to suggest a strong dependence on imports, which from the outset makes these economies highly dependent on the behaviour of international markets. Thus, in a significant way, some exogenous shocks help, for example, to show the degree of economic resilience that these economies in particular possess, as was the case with the exogenous shocks caused by the covid-19 pandemic.

For a large number of economies that are initially dependent on international markets, negative shocks promote a kind of resilience test, in other words, they measure the response capacity that these economies in particular are able to provide in the short term. Thus, the evidence suggests that in the short term there is an initial inability on the part of these economies to respond, and that this inability has been strongly related to the levels of functioning of economic institutions, most of which are initially fragile and unproductive.

The work of the Nobel Prize winners in economics really helps to understand how institutions work, where in most poor countries there are extractive institutions that have been strongly correlated with the exclusive policies adopted by developing countries. Thus, it plausibly represents the cause of the failure of nations. In economies where there are inefficiencies in terms of income distribution and lack of access to basic needs, there is a set of institutions inherited from imperialist countries [1]. Of course, the particularity has to do with the fact that, after independence, 95 per cent of African countries that had good production systems at the time went on to total failure, some countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Democratic Congo, Congo Zaire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Swaziland and recently, as can be seen from the history of the Portuguese-speaking countries, in the particular case of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau, the agrarian structure of these countries before independence produced a significant 80% for domestic production and for exports. Some countries that experienced quantified internal interference through civil conflicts due to the strengthening of the vicious circle, had to opt for economic self-destruction, as was the case in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, where the regimes became semi-totalitarian, mainly in search of a set of maintenance of the vicious circles, the same happened with Congo, under the Mobuto regime. The same happened in Congo under the Mobuto regime, which from the outset helped to implement a set of exclusive policies, and on the other hand, the underdevelopment of agriculture itself, in line with the very inefficiency of agrarian policy on the one hand, and on the other hand, in line with the inefficiencies of infrastructure, i.e. in a large part of these countries in particular, the infrastructure needed for growth and the strengthening of the economy itself continues to be lacking for various reasons, as we will see in the following sections.

The elites who hold economic and political power contribute to the agrarian destruction of African countries. Naturally, this is due to a number of reasons. The first has to do with the fact that these countries have a set of economic institutions under the control of just a small group of people who largely hold absolute economic power, which nevertheless helps to significantly increase the levels of corruption, the second reason has to do with profits, but a large part of these economies have a strong dependence on maintaining their institutions because of the profits they make from maintaining these institutions as a way of safeguarding the interests of a small group.

The failure of agriculture can also be explained by looking at the curse of natural resources, in which most countries are trapped. The example of this has in fact been some nations that during the golden age had above average growth, which in fact ended up consolidating a kind of impoverishing growth, naturally this type of growth has to do with the fact that these countries in general, had economic growth that did not allow them by way of example to guarantee greater levels of economic prosperity in particular, the case of Angola helps us to better understand how this in fact occurred. During the years 2004-2013, Angola was one of the economies with the highest growth rates in particular, so it is plausible that this growth was not in fact sustainable enough to allow a turnaround to begin with, especially with regard to its agricultural base, which after independence became deficient and totally destroyed. Angola's economic destruction was plausibly caused by a series of political interferences that helped to consolidate its failure and to consolidate the inefficiencies of the economic policies adopted by the authorities. Of course, unlike Mozambique, the country tried to introduce a series of agrarian reforms, which had no effect from the outset. The land reforms that took place in some African countries were in fact important and relevant in terms of realising their degree of economic intervention from the outset. For example, the North African countries that introduced land reforms in their agrarian system also helped to strengthen the levels of agricultural production that these countries generally had in a particular way.

As an example, there are countries like Algeria, where agrarian reform has had a significant impact on land distribution. One of the initial reasons for the failure of agrarian policy in Africa in general has to do with the fact that a large part of the productive land that should be productive in the first place becomes generally unproductive, mainly due to causes related to, for example, the lack of a private business sector capable enough to promote agribusiness in particular, some evidence helps to understand this better, for example in Zimbabwe, where, after former President Mugabe came to power, he promoted a series of economic destructions through the agricultural base. This destruction occurred above all from the moment that a large part of the productive land became unproductive, so this inability to produce was due to the fact that Mugabe, for example, preferred to distribute the land to his friends without the power to leverage, for example, the economy through agriculture.

The example of Zimbabwe is similar to what happened in Angola. In the case of Angola in particular, the authorities in the years 2012-2014 tried to implement agribusiness, but with public investment of more than 2 billion dollars, the large farms subsequently became unproductive. Mozambique, for example, despite the attempt, the agrarian policy continues to guarantee greater levels of sustainability for its economy. This sustainability is due to the fact that the agricultural sector makes a significant contribution to GDP from the outset.

Inefficient Land Policy and Economic Institutions

The inefficiencies of agrarian policy can largely be quantified by the successive failures of these policies in general. For example, a large proportion of sub-Saharan African countries nevertheless have a strong potential in terms of both water resources and an abundance of fertile land for cultivation, Thus, according to 10% of fertile land in sub-Saharan African countries has been used for agricultural cultivation with greater relevance, however, a large part of the agricultural potential remains in fact unutilised with greater relevance for water resources on the other hand. Nigeria, for example, has the potential to produce tomatoes [2]. A large part of the tomatoes produced in the country are imported mainly from Europe, especially Spain. However, due to the cost of production in Nigeria and the high costs related to the lack of inputs and mechanisation, tomato production in the region is not viable. Thus, in general terms, the value chain in sub-Saharan Africa continues to represent one of the major obstacles to the growth and strengthening of agriculture on the continent, and is naturally one of the strong reasons behind the continuous increase in imports of agricultural commodities, as illustrated by the example of Nigeria.

As a result, African countries generally fail to capitalise on the absolute advantages that they have from the outset with the potential of the fertile land that they generally possess to a significant degree. Vicious circles help to strengthen these inefficiencies on the one hand, in line with the extractive institutions that exist.

There is a strong correlation between economic institutions and agrarian policy in particular, where economic institutions in most of these countries have become weak, but have been unable to promote greater inclusion, especially with regard to agrarian policy in Africa in particular. So, would these economies have become more inclusive if they had actually implemented a set of inclusive agrarian policies? In fact, some approaches show precisely that they would. For example, experiments in some African countries, such as Mali and Malawi, have had significant effects in the meantime, insofar as they have increased support for fertilisers by farmers, especially rice farmers, and there has in fact been a significant increase in rice production levels, especially in family farming, where a large number of families have gone on to produce hundreds of tonnes of rice.

Rice cultivation in most countries continues to represent, for example, the crop with the highest levels of demand in African markets. This is mainly due to the lack of a cereal production base capable of promoting higher levels of aggregate supply in particular. Thus, for example, according to the basic needs approach, the consumption of rice is very important for African families in particular. For example, a large proportion of food deficiencies and diseases related to malnutrition have to do above all with the lack of consumption of cereals and other important calories that could, for example, allow African children in particular to grow more, both cognitively and physically

Agrarian policy in many African countries is still inefficient, due on the one hand to a number of reasons that have been quantified by institutional inefficiencies, especially in sub-Saharan African countries where there has been no significant agrarian reform, which from the outset should enable a number of these countries to make the agrarian sector resilient and better able to respond to the different problems that a large part of these countries face from the outset. North Africa has in fact had a different experience to that of the sub-Saharan African countries. For example, some countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Egypt have had the opportunity to experiment with agrarian reform, so most of these countries do in fact have something in common, A large part of the developing economies do indeed have problems related to access to land and the way in which their governments manage to guarantee a greater degree of security, particularly in relation to the agrarian structure itself.

Some sub-Saharan African countries have managed to escape the pattern insofar as a large part of them have actually implemented some inclusive policies, above all, the inclusive agrarian policy that has allowed a large part of the population to leave, for example, especially the rural population, which initially has a great dependence on the agrarian sector as the best way to significantly exclude themselves from poverty. Thus, the examples of South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe help us to understand the levels of agrarian policy implemented in these countries in a particular

way. For example, in countries like Zimbabwe, where there was a very significant agrarian potential, it was possible to guarantee excellent levels of growth for some agricultural crops, especially commodities that are in greater demand on the markets. During colonisation, Zambia always had an organised agrarian structure with the initial capacity to guarantee a response to market demand in particular. Naturally, the political interference that took place over the course of a few years meant that a large part of these structures were in fact significantly lacking. This lack was in fact due to the fact that political interference had a very significant impact, and this impact significantly allowed a number of institutions, especially economic ones, which were in fact directly dependent on agrarian infrastructures as promoters of prosperity in most cases.

The inefficiency of agrarian policy is quantified from the outset to the extent that a large part of the infrastructure, on the one hand, is incapable of guaranteeing sustainable growth from the outset, based above all on the capacity for growth of agricultural production in particular. This has in fact happened in a different way in some sub-Saharan African countries, where the exploitation of natural resources has in fact always had a major influence from the outset and which has on the one hand guaranteed a sustainable growth base for a large part of these economies in particular. Thus, some plausible reasons do help us to understand how African economies could in fact become sustainable, considering of course a sustainability based above all on significant increases in agricultural production to the detriment, for example, of mineral resource production, some evidence clearly shows us that a large proportion of developing countries, most of which remain poor, in fact have their institutions anchored in both a vicious circle and a virtuous circle. Thus, in a plausible way, the virtuous circle has in fact been responsible in some cases for creating economic prosperity, on the other hand, vicious circles anchored to economic institutions have in fact promoted continuous economic failure, this economic failure is quantified to the extent that, in other words, both production and the growth itself of the economies are in fact not aligned with the objectives that were intended in the first place, in a significant way.

Thus, the evidence in most sub-Saharan African countries shows that there are, for example, a number of shortcomings, mainly related to the application of agrarian policy, which initially has to do with land distribution, while 95% of farmers in sub-Saharan African countries do in fact need a large proportion of agricultural inputs, on the other hand, the majority of agriculture in Africa is still subsistence farming, where the majority of producers are still families, with families accounting for 90% of the continent's agricultural production. The discontinuity of a large part of Africa's agricultural policies has yet to guarantee higher levels of production, mainly related to the context of certainty, as opposed to the initial situation where the context of uncertainty in fact dominates. Thus, in a large part of the countries, agricultural mechanisation is still lacking and the levels of agricultural investment have in fact been unsustainable in order to guarantee sustainable growth in the first place, especially the agricultural investments that mostly have to do with the necessary infrastructures and the machinery used in large part to guarantee greater growth in particular. As far as agricultural investments in Africa are concerned, in most countries these investments have not been capable enough to guarantee that there will be greater production in the first place, for example, because of this inability, as we have been analysing.

The experience of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia, especially during colonisation and in the post-colonisation period, allows us to quantify in a meaningful way how these countries were able to guarantee sustainable production, especially production that was largely in line with the different needs of the inhabitants. The history of Zimbabwe during the British colonisation saw exceptional growth, mainly related to the growth of agriculture in a large part of the countries in particular, so during this period, for example, a large part of agricultural production was always carried out by a group of farms that were always under the control of the majority of the agricultural companies owned by the British at the time. Thus, most of these British companies actually helped to strengthen the existing levels of infrastructure. The level of infrastructure, however, made it possible to boost agricultural production on the one hand, and on the other, it actually helped to strengthen the correlation between the economic institutions themselves and the agricultural infrastructure.

Both Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia's economic infrastructures have, however, made it possible to guarantee, for example, a significant growth in agricultural production levels. Thus, the agrarian policy at the time in most of these countries always had to do with an inclusive type of agrarian policy, and inclusive agrarian policies aim above all to guarantee the strengthening of the agrarian sector in particular and a strengthening of agricultural production levels in particular. As an example, the political interference seen in the three countries was not very great, especially the direct interference, which was mostly quantified by the needs themselves, such as the existence of a great need related to the restructuring of the agricultural sector in particular.

Thus, there are plausibly some particularities that allow us to quantify in a plausible way how the interferences have in fact been significant for the improvement of the levels related to agriculture itself in particular, with the exception of Zimbabwe, where agriculture in particular had a major decline, this decline had to do with the fact that most of the infrastructures existing at the time had a different fate than normal, for example, as happened in Namibia where, after the political interferences, these infrastructures remained in a significant way. Thus, the case of Zimbabwe in particular shows us how the agrarian structure continued to be relevant, that is, in the period before independence, of course. Political interference, which was directly quantified by the successive conflicts that the country experienced from the outset for decades, and on the other hand direct interference on the part of the then President, for the most part ensured that agrarian policy did indeed become inefficient, in line with the levels of the vicious circle that the country

was in at the time, even after independence from the British.

The vicious circles in Zimbabwe helped to consolidate a failed state in the country. This failed state was in fact significantly fuelled by interferences relating to the way in which land was distributed on the one hand and the way in which, for example, the government was supposed to guarantee a greater distribution of the levels relating to the infrastructure necessary for the growth and development of agriculture on the other. Thus, experience shows us that agrarian policy before independence from the British was in fact much better and the levels of its application were in fact very well consolidated compared to the related post-independence period. In the post-independence period, there was a particularity. Most of this had to do with the fact that the President played an important role in improving, for example, the levels of agricultural production. Thus, the worsening of investment and the lack, on the one hand, of the need for greater growth that would actually be in line with the levels of application of agricultural policy, as was the case long before independence.

Another great peculiarity of the Mugabe regime had to do with the fact that there was, for example, a set of initiatives from the outset, which were always quantified by the way in which the major agrarian infrastructures were taken away from a large part of the landowners who always had greater interference, above all because they were in line with the vicious circles that existed at the time. Would Zimbabwe really have a different economic trajectory to the one it is on now? In all likelihood, Zimbabwe would have become an agricultural powerhouse in sub-Saharan Africa if it had a different trajectory, but after these interferences, agricultural policy has become significantly inefficient and unsustainable, and above all, incapable of becoming sufficiently capable.

Other countries have in fact followed a different path, for example economies such as Angola's, where agricultural production levels have always deteriorated, especially in the post-independence period, where agricultural production levels have in fact deteriorated in line with what has happened in other African countries, in Angola political interference has helped to consolidate the stagnation of the agricultural sector in particular, but this has ensured a greater inability to produce on the part of the authorities who have absolute control of the agricultural sector from the outset. Thus, there has always been no agricultural policy in Angola that could really become inclusive, for example. In fact, what happened was a set of inefficiencies, mostly due to institutional inefficiency. To a large extent, however, political interference has made it possible to build a significant vicious circle. This vicious circle has significantly allowed countries to become unsustainable, especially in the presence of continuous inefficiencies in the functioning of the institutions themselves. The evidence in many African countries clearly shows the existence of over-dependence, but this has to do with the fact that most agricultural production in these countries is initially concentrated in family production, which is largely responsible for the production of 90% of production. However, there are other strong reasons behind the inefficiencies of agricultural policy in most African countries, which, on the one hand, have to do with the fact that they are not characterised as inclusive policies, especially in countries where there has been a large presence of political interference, quantified by ongoing conflicts in most central and southern African countries. For the most part, institutions fail because there is no greater capacity on their part to guarantee the greatest possible inclusion for farmers. Some countries, such as Ghana, South Africa and Namibia, present a different scenario to the one we see today, for example, but these countries have managed to guarantee a greater capacity to respond to the endogenous shocks which, for the most part, have significantly affected the levels of agricultural production in particular, especially in a context of uncertainty where most of these countries have always been. The example of South Africa and other English-speaking countries is naturally different because these countries nevertheless have a great policy of inclusion, especially policies that have always been related to the way in which governments in particular have sought to guarantee greater dynamics related to the levels of growth that were occurring in these economies at the time.

Some experiments in Ghana and Mali, for example, clearly show a great deal of inclusion, especially of public policies that have allowed a significant reduction in poverty levels in these countries from the outset. On the other hand, these experiments have allowed these countries to actually promote a greater dynamic related to sustainable agriculture. In Mali, for example, farmers who have benefited from production incentives have managed to guarantee higher levels of growth in the main agricultural commodities, such as cereals, where production has more than doubled, thus making it possible to guarantee the best levels of social inclusion and a significant reduction in poverty in particular.

The agrarian sustainability that has taken place in many African countries has mostly had to do with increases in incentive capacity on the part of the main players, such as greater incentive capacity through agricultural inputs and through institutional growth in particular. Thus, institutions that have managed, for example, to guarantee greater participation by the poor and peasants in particular have also managed to promote greater improvements in social and financial assistance in particular. Thus, the economies that still depend on agriculture where there is no significant mechanisation have been the economies with the greatest capacity to adapt to the exogenous and endogenous shocks that have occurred. Much of the evidence also shows that there is in fact a great deal of inefficiency related to the use of agricultural land, which nevertheless constitutes the greatest agricultural potential in many African countries, most of which is still untapped, due in part to some of the many reasons that we have in fact had the opportunity to explain in the current approach. Thus, the efficient utilisation of agricultural potential may depend, for example, on a number of relevant variables such as the ability to access land, the levels of technical and scientific knowledge that these societies possess and can implement with the aim of promoting greater interaction and application of the levels of production in

a meaningful way, ownership, on the other hand, is still a major obstacle to ensuring that there is the greatest possible support in a plausible way. On the other hand, there is another relevant factor, which in general terms has to do with the way in which investment levels in agriculture are made from the outset, so there are in fact a number of reasons that may contribute to this lack of investment in the agricultural sector, especially investments that have always been linked, above all, to the mechanisation capacity of the agricultural sector in particular. Mechanisation in particular, especially in the large rural areas of African countries, is still a major challenge for the agricultural sector in general, and these challenges are in line with the low levels of literacy in these economies in particular. Thus, in the majority of African societies, there is still no significant improvement in terms of literacy itself, especially literacy geared towards the areas of agricultural engineering and in-depth knowledge related to soil handling, which from the outset assumes that the majority of agriculture is still done empirically. Alongside the investments that should in fact be channelled into a more efficient agricultural policy, there are other relevant factors that have to do, above all, with the way in which governments should in fact ensure the efficient distribution of land. Land distribution therefore presupposes the existence of land reform in these countries. In some African countries, where there has been land reform, they have been able to dynamise their economies and the sector in particular.

Agrarian reform as a promoter of agricultural prosperity

In many developing countries, agrarian reform has guaranteed a major boost to their economies. This boost has in fact been accompanied by a series of activities that have made it possible to promote a different dynamic from the one that has been seen in many African countries, for example, in addition to guaranteeing, for example, an equitable and fair distribution of land, agrarian reforms have also made it possible to guarantee greater growth, most of which is related to the levels of production capacity that these economies can actually produce, both in the short term and in the long term, as has been seen in some developing economies in particular.

Thus, the success of agrarian reform will in fact depend on a number of relevant factors, most of which have to do with the way in which countries in fact guarantee greater dynamism in terms of both accessibility and the promotion of these accessibilities in particular, while allowing for a de facto synchronisation with the desired levels of production in the economy and with the levels of economic growth in particular that economies can in fact guarantee. Thus, in many countries where, for example, there is still less capacity for transformation, they have not been able to ensure that these transformations are in fact sufficiently capable of promoting greater sustainability in terms of the particular guarantees that should in fact allow the potential in general to be very well utilised in order to guarantee greater sustainability and greater efficiency in terms of the amount of land available for production, and thus the land available for production has largely been the greatest promoter of the reduction in rural poverty that has occurred in a large part of developing societies. North Africa in fact presents a good example of land reform on the African continent, where from the outset both Algeria and Egypt have in fact managed to promote greater dynamics related to the desired levels of production in particular. The evidence seems to show that there has been a significant increase in agricultural production as a result of these reforms, especially those that were carried out in a context of uncertainty, where in fact there has always been a great need, mostly related to the ability to make more than significant changes that were in line with the needs of the economies in general. Thus, in recent years there has been a major deterioration in agricultural production levels in many countries, both in southern Africa and the countries of central Africa, where agricultural policy has been largely affected by a significant set of political interferences, on the other hand, there are in fact other reasons that for some years have in fact helped to promote the failure of agricultural policy in some countries, as seen in Zimbabwe, which has been a great example of the failure of agrarian policy, naturally due to the social exclusion that has taken place in that country, as was the case in Zambia, in southern Africa, other examples of the failure of agrarian policy due to social exclusion, can naturally be the fact that there has been, for example, a series of expropriations of land that was previously productive and has in fact become unproductive. Some examples of land reform in Africa help us to understand how some countries in general have managed to transform their agriculture in particular, as was the case in [3].

So, after all, what does the success of agrarian reform depend on? The evidence shows that the success of land reform depends on the ability of the authorities to, for example, adapt a set of measures that can guarantee that inclusion through land policy becomes possible in a significant way and guarantee significant improvements in the way the authorities should promote such actions, considering the levels of multidimensional and rural poverty that have occurred in these economies in particular. The economic potential that exists in a large number of African countries can in fact be harnessed through significant increases in access to land and guarantees, particularly in terms of ownership, in line with the perfect functioning of institutions and the incorporation of technology, and of course in line with the capacity for economic transformation itself through such land reforms. In they reinforce the idea of the transformations that have taken place, above all, the reforms that have nevertheless guaranteed some efficiencies in the distribution of land in particular [4]. also show the relevance of rural transformations through land reforms, introduced particularly by the South African authorities [5].

Investments in Agriculture

Investments in agriculture, however, represent the best and most efficient alternative to guaranteeing, for example, greater capacity to transform agrarian policy in particular. Thus, a large part of the investments in agriculture, especially in developing countries, are still very inefficient, and this has been largely related to the way in which the societies that

need these investments should, on the other hand, be able to guarantee, for example, a significant improvement in the way in which these investments become inclusive for a large majority of developing farmers, despite the great relevance that investments in the agricultural sector present, they nevertheless have great relevance in terms of the way in which these investments are channelled. For example, in many of Africa's developing countries, precision agriculture is de facto non-existent, and this is largely accompanied by the ongoing social exclusion that has taken place in these countries in particular. Thus, investments start from the premise that they do indeed have some factors to take into account, i.e. largely linked to the capacity of economies in particular to transform, on the other hand, mostly related to the capacity of societies to be able to promote greater dynamics, for example, which is in fact related to the capacity of institutions to be able to promote greater possible inclusion. Thus, this promotion will in fact have to take into account, for example, the technical capacity itself and the attractiveness of the investments that have been made in these economies in particular, for example the attractiveness of the investments in and a large part of this relates, for example, to the fact that an economy, especially a small economy, is able, for example, to promote a good business environment for the agricultural sector, which from the outset will have to take into account some very important variables such as the growth levels of the economy, inflation levels, the agricultural value chain, which from the outset is very important for affirming investments in agriculture. However, the agricultural value chain is the main premise for greater development of the agricultural sector in particular. Countries that have, for example, an excellent agricultural value chain, are those that are able, for example, to present a set of infrastructures of great importance to their economies, above all, the production support infrastructures that make the agricultural industry in particular more attractive.

Thus, it is naturally plausible that the infrastructures in certain countries are in fact those that not only guarantee the greatest capacity for resilience and institutional growth, but also ensure that they are in line with international requirements in terms of attracting foreign direct investment. On the other hand, it is perhaps plausible to consider the significant improvement in the agricultural business environment, which can largely be understood in the form of an index. This index will naturally be the better the capacity of each of the variables that make up the business environment, with greater relevance to attractiveness through interest rates, which are identified as being of great relevance to the economy in particular, on the other hand, it has to do with the ability of the authorities to ensure that, in general terms, economies become as inclusive as possible, considering, for example, greater dynamism in terms of the fact that there is, for example, greater attention that is actually in line with the needs of the agricultural sector in particular. On the other hand, the agricultural infrastructures that exist from the outset make it possible to realise how, for example, they can bring about the transformations necessary for a continuous and significant improvement in the levels of economic prosperity that are actually intended to be achieved, i.e. both in the short term and in the long term. Thus, in the long term, the economies with the greatest attractiveness will be the ones that can, for example, guarantee greater dynamism in terms of the investments that are channelled into them.

However, the cyclical structure of the macroeconomic aggregates can guarantee a greater boost to the economy and promote greater resilience, so, on the other hand, the levels of resilience themselves will be related, for example, to the way in which interest rate levels in particular can in fact plausibly affect the attractiveness of investments, that is, naturally considering a greater policy of both financial and monetary inclusion, i.e. ensuring that interest rates are in fact in line with financial integration, naturally being as attractive as necessary that can for example guarantee greater integration and attraction of investments via the necessary foreign direct investments, to guarantee for example greater growth in particular. show some of the determinants of investment in agriculture in Africa, which are naturally relevant to understanding how they ensure the significant growth of the main agricultural commodities, show on the one hand the relevance of agricultural investments, especially in terms of their contribution to GDP in recent years, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Some determinants of investment levels in the Rwandan agricultural sector are significantly analysed in [6-8]. Thus, on the one hand, food security is naturally relevant, especially in a context of uncertainty, but there is a significant presence of increases in expenditure on food, especially for families in sub-Saharan Africa, where this difference is proportionally greater, as analyses so naturally food subsidies have helped to alleviate food costs [9].

Investments in agriculture, however, determine the success of agricultural policy in particular, considering that it is naturally possible to make agriculture sustainable through these investments. Sustainability, however, will depend on other relevant factors that ultimately dictate how agricultural policy itself is implemented, especially when there is a relationship between agricultural policy and investments, which is naturally a positive correlation that ultimately guarantees significant sustainability. Ensuring sustainable growth in the agricultural sector will depend from the outset on other factors that are still quite relevant from an economic point of view and that ultimately guarantee greater dynamics in terms of production levels and productivity in particular.

Thus, guaranteeing higher levels of productivity through agriculture is nevertheless relevant and significant in order to understand from the outset how investments can, for example, contribute to increasing the production chain of countries in particular, which from the outset makes it possible to introduce a different dynamic into the production structure itself, to a large extent the production structure ends up guaranteeing, for example, the way in which guarantees of sustainability should be provided for countries in particular. As has been the case in some countries in particular. Especially in developing countries, there are some particularities that really differentiate the way these countries act politically in general. There is some evidence that clearly shows that investments in agriculture in Africa's developing countries have not managed to create a sustainable dynamic, in the way that a large part of their governments have

focused on exclusive agricultural policies. Thus, exclusive agrarian policies have always had a major influence on how these policies are actually implemented, especially in a context where they mostly exclude a large part of the population from being able to participate in political activities in general. There seems to be a small correlation between agricultural policies and the actual levels of institutional development, i.e. institutions that manage to have a different dynamic to the normal one, on the other hand, manage to allow for a plausible increase in growth levels, both in agricultural production and productivity in the agricultural sector in particular. Some evidence shows that there is a significant increase in production levels when significant investments are made in agriculture at the outset, largely when a number of factors are increased, such as the increase in machinery needed to increase production and, in particular, the sustainability levels of the economies themselves. For example, in many developing economies, there is a great inefficiency related to the way in which institutions manage to create a dynamic that is different from what has been seen in many developing countries in particular.

There are also other relevant factors that help us to understand investments in agriculture. These factors have to do with the level of the economies, i.e. the more stable economies were able for many years to provide greater capacity for investment in the economy in particular. This ability to transform the economies had a great deal to do with the economic development that these economies were actually able to introduce, the levels of industrialisation, in some cases translated into forms of guarantees that allowed for more than adequate production, especially from an institutional point of view. In our current approach, we point to investments in agriculture as one of the biggest drivers of economic failure for institutions in particular and for countries in general, because these countries have largely failed to create a dynamic that differs from the one that countries have in general. For there to be a real difference between the levels of investment in agriculture, however, it is necessary for policies to be largely committed to the particular needs of a large part of the population in general. Another factor of great importance, which is naturally aligned with the mechanisation of the industry itself, has to do with the fact that a large part of the economies have a significant lack of this, which is on the one hand related to technology in particular, where technology has ended up guaranteeing a very different dynamic, above all with the significant presence of precision agriculture. The promotion of sustainable agricultural policies, however, has been viable for realising growth in particular. High-precision and efficient agriculture takes into account the capacity of the existing transformation, in other words, agricultural sustainability is naturally viable when there are both guarantee mechanisms and mechanisms to promote the transformation of economies in particular.

The turning point of 's agricultural sector

From the outset, the fact that a large part of African economies still have higher levels of growth in agricultural commodities makes it possible to realise how agriculture itself can adapt to reality and promote relative productivity levels. In fact, in some economies, where agriculture still manages to make a greater contribution to GDP, policies of exclusion end up determining the turning point of the agricultural sector. The economies that have managed to achieve greater structural dynamics are those that have allowed for greater attractiveness from the outset, especially attractiveness related to promoting the productivity levels that should be adopted from the outset. The shift towards a more inclusive agrarian policy is also related to the way in which the policy tools were actually introduced with the aim of meeting a set of criteria, for example, in most economies the authorities have in fact always been unable to guarantee, for example, a large proportion of farmers in West Africa find it cheap to import agricultural goods, to the detriment of local production, which is nevertheless costly. Coupled with these factors are, for example, the lack of a set of investments aimed particularly at agriculture. Some countries in Africa, however, have managed to ensure greater dynamism, mainly related to the levels of investment in particular, which have also made it possible to promote greater production capacity and growth, in line with the agricultural prosperity that the countries have had to implement and follow. There are, however, some particularities that end up significantly dictating the course of the trajectory in many African countries in particular, by way of example for the resource curse that has occurred in these countries in particular, as analysed in strongly reinforced in [10,11].

Conclusion

In many developing countries, approaches to food security seem to suggest a great deal of inefficiency in different areas. As we have seen, agricultural policies in most countries have been unable to promote great prosperity for their populations, especially in a context of uncertainty, as some studies suggest according to the approach. Thus, it seems plausible to realise that despite the existence of quantified potential in the availability of land, there are nevertheless some factors that naturally hinder the growth of the agricultural sector and its respective development, for example the levels of investment that should initially promote greater growth in production capacity itself. A large number of African countries are highly inefficient due to the fact that they are significantly dependent on imports and the limitations they have in particular.

Thus, developing countries that have not yet managed to achieve significant levels of efficient agrarian policies are stuck in the trap of extreme poverty, as the Banerjee and Ester Duflo studies suggest. On the other hand, Sachs suggests that too much reliance on natural resources as the only alternative for guaranteeing the growth levels of economies in particular has significantly increased the levels of uncertainty in these economies in particular.

Thus, both the curse of natural resources and the lack of investment, which should guarantee greater food security capacity from the outset, end up promoting greater inefficiency, with regard to growth itself, particularly in agriculture.

Some experiments, such as Rwanda, Mozambique and other African countries, show a distinct trajectory in a particular way. South Africa, for example, is an example of the guarantees of efficient agricultural policies, which, on the one hand, end up determining how food security and poverty should actually be reduced, as has happened in some sub-Saharan African countries.

Thus, our approach suggests that both the lack of food security and inefficiencies in agricultural production help and contribute to the failure of agriculture in Africa, in line with the increase in institutional failures at the outset.

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